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The NLRB And The Will Of Congress:




The National Labor Relations Board is the chief administrator
of our national labor policy. The duty of the Board, under the
law, is to carry out the will of Congress and give it direction. As
stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, sitting as Circuit Judge in Johnson
v. United States,' "[t]he legislature has the power to decide what
the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, how-
ever indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed." It
has been argued, however, that the Board, in the administration of
the National Labor Relations Act, has not followed Congressional
intent and has exceeded its powers. Whether the NLRB has exer-
cised powers greater than those granted by Congress and whether
it has ignored the will of the Legislature were questions raised
in recent hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers. It is the purpose of this article to review
Board decisional doctrine in the light of congressional intent in
administering our labor laws.
* J.D., 1936, Indiana University; Partner, Spencer, Fane, Britt &
Browne, Kansas City, Missouri. This article is based upon a statement be-
fore the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States Senate, April 30, 1968.
1. 163 F. 30, 32 (1908).
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SCHEME OF LABOR LEGISLATION
Prior to discussing specific decisions, it might be well to re-
view the fundamental concept on which the Wagner Act, the Taft-
Hartley Act, and the Landrum-Griffin Act were all based. This
concept is designed to insure "free collective bargaining" or, more
precisely, voluntary labor contracts voluntarily negotiated, by
achieving a balanced relationship between labor and management.
This principle was recognized three years before the Wagner
Act, by the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which
curtailed the use of injunctions by federal courts in labor disputes
in order to assure free interplay between labor, on the one hand,
and management on the other. Senator Robert Wagner, author of
the legislation, noted that the government was to occupy "a neutral
position, lending its extraordinary power neither to those who
would have labor unorganized nor to those who would have organ-
ized it. ... " The Congress, in passing the Wagner Act three years
later, promoted the "practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing" by guaranteeing combinations of workers an equal bargain-
ing power with employers. The Taft-Hartley Act and the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act, reaffirming a congressional desire to retain free
collective bargaining, endeavored to balance labor-management re-
lations by curbing excessive union power. Senator Robert Taft
stated in the congressional debates on the Taft-Hartley Act, "un-
reasonable power" leads to the exercise of power "to accomplish
ends which are not reasonable," and where there is a balance of
power, "neither side feels that it can make an unreasonable de-
mand and get away with it."
'3
The Supreme Court also recognized that by "adjusting of com-
peting interests" voluntary collective bargaining would remain the
keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace.
4
Labor legislation, therefore, has erected a structure to achieve
equality in bargaining power so that competing interests can be
fairly balanced and result in fair settlements. Congress legislated
to the end that abuses be curtailed in those areas of the labor-
management complex where excessive power on one side or the
other might weaken free collective bargaining and thereby impinge
on the public interest. Bargaining table equality, then, was the
design of labor legislation.
2. 75 CONG. REC. 4915 (1932).
3. 93 CONC. REC. 3835 (1947).
4. Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
INCREASING INDUSTRIAL STRIFE
Today, traditional collective bargaining procedure is not work-
ing to the public satisfaction. Much is heard about free collective
bargaining and strikes affecting the public interest, and it is in-
deed a matter of congressional concern. Department of Labor
statistics disclose that there were more strikes called in 1967 than
in any year since 1954; and it ran still higher in 1968. The pro-
longed strikes in 1965 and 1966 in the maritime industry and in
the New York City transit system are memorable examples. A
lengthy strike against New York newspapers forced one of them
permanently to close its doors. The President, in his message to
Congress in January, 1966, called for remedial legislation, but
offered no proposed solution. Critical strikes are still occurring.
A lengthy strike in the copper industry was settled after some
eight months' duration. A Detroit newspaper strike lasted for
months. A nation-wide telephone communication strike was only
recently settled.5
REsPoNsIBILrrY OF NLRB
As stated above, the NLRB is charged with administering our
labor policy in accord with the will of Congress. It may be seri-
ously questioned, however, in the light of disturbing Labor Board
decisions, that the Board has fulfilled its responsibility. There
can be no question that the last two major pieces of federal labor
legislation-Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin-clearly manifest
an intention on the part of Congress to restrict the previous immun-
ity given to union activity. The Landrum-Griffin Act was the out-
growth of a hearing by the Senate Select Committee on activities
in the labor field, where glaring examples of abuse of union power
were presented to the committee. The attempt was to limit "black-
mail" picketing where a union pickets for recognition as bargain-
ing agent for employees, although it does not represent a majority;
it restricted hot cargo agreements by which a union forces one
employer to agree not to do business with another employer with
whom the union may have a dispute; and it sought to eliminate
secondary boycott practices which allowed unions to picket or strike
neutral or secondary employers.
Recognizing that the law is indeed controversial, never "easy'!
or "dispassionate," and that some provisions are subtly, if not
ambiguously drawn and recognizing further the integrity of Board
members, yet I respectfully suggest that Board decisions in many
areas have failed to follow the direction of Congress. For this
reason they have unsettled the balance of power essential to sound
collective bargaining and may well have contributed to indus-
5. U.S. Dept. of Labor, BLS, 91 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 10, at 64, 127
(Oct. 1968).
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trial strife and inflationary settlements. Since the Board appears
unlikely to change its views, corrective legislation is needed if we
are to maintain free collective bargaining as the cornerstore of our
national labor policy.
In 1963 I reviewed NLRB decisions and concluded:
There are those in this country who feel that our laws
should be made so as to facilitate the attainment of a
particular objective. If this is to be accomplished, it should
be done only through changes in legislation made by Con-
gress. It should not be done by changes in established
interpretations of the law. The recent decisions of the new
Board majority have done just this, and in so doing the
Board's majority, we submit, has just as effectively usurped
the power of Congress as if they had rewritten the pro-
visions of the law. The precedent being set by the Board,
if not halted and reversed, can only demean the Board's
stature and the reliability of all administrative law.6
BOARD DECISIONS
Admittedly, the Board's task, considering the explosive nature
of the labor-management relationship, is a difficult one. I do not
here quarrel with the mine-run case, the vast majority the Board
is called upon to decide, even though I might disagree on a case-by-
case examination. These decisions are rational and have support
in the record. My dissent lies in certain policy positions the Board
has taken where the Board has strayed from congressional intent
and has used its extraordinary power to shackle and even reverse
directives laid down by Congress for the Board to follow. When
considered as a party of the whole, the decisions appear to have
canted the entire collective bargaining structure which Congress
had legislated. They run from the starting point of aiding the
union in its initial attempts at organization, then through Labor
Board elections, to orders to bargain without an election or despite
an election which the union may have lost, then to increasing the
power of unions at the bargaining table and, finally, in an em-
ployer versus union test of economic strength after an impasse is
reached. In this entire labor-management spectrum, the NLRB, I
respectifully submit, has not carried out the will of Congress.
QUESTIONS OF REPRESENTATION
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board relied on "extent of
6. The National Labor Relations Board: Labor Law Rewritten, 49
A.B.A.J. 64 (Jan. 1963).
union organization" as a basis for determining bargaining units.
The Taft-Hartley Act changed the rule, providing in section 9 (c) (5)
that "the extent to which the employees have organized shall not
be controlling."' Additionally, section 9 (b) of the Act was modified
to reflect the Taft-Hartley amendments which granted employees
not only the right to self-organization but the concomitant right
to refrain from such organization. The Board was mandated to
determine the appropriate unit, not merely to assure employees
"their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining," as
expressed in the Wagner Act, but instead to insure employees "the
fullest freedom" to exercise all of their rights guaranteed by the
Act. Yet in Quaker City Life Ins. Co.,8 the Board found fault with
well-established criteria for bargaining units of insurance agents.
For a period of seventeen years, the Board had consistently held
that state-wide or company-wide units were appropriate for insur-
ance agents.9 The Board discarded the old principles on the
ground that the unions had been unable to organize on such a
basis, and found smaller units to be appropriate. The Board's
rationale seemed to be based on extent of organization. It said:
"[S] tate-wide or company-wide organization has not materialized,
and the result of the rule has been to arrest the organizational
development of insurance agents. . ".'."10 Similarly, in Say-On-
Drugs, Inc.," and in Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc.,1 the Board
disregarded a retail unit embracing all stores in an administrative
division of a chain or in a geographic area, and found a single-store
unit or less appropriate, notwithstanding the established criteria
pointed to the broader unit. In reversing the Board in Frisch's,3
the court said all stores in the chain were appropriate because they
were "alike . . . as peas in a pod" and it saw no basis for the
Board's fragmentizing of the unit. In Stern's, Paramus,"4 Arnold
Constable Corp.,' and Lord & Taylor,16 the Board again departed
from its prior policy under which store-wide units were considered
the appropriate unit in the retail department stores, and now per-
mits separate units of selling and nonselling personnel. The Board
has announced it will adhere to its position on unit findings in
chain stores, despite reversals by the courts of appeals. Noting
the reversals, the Board, in Haag Drug Co.,' 7 stated nevertheless
7. Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
8. 134 N.L.R.B. 960 (1961).
9. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635 (1944).
10. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 960, 962 (1961).
11. 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
12. 147 N.L.R.B. 551 (1964).
13. NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895, 896 (7th
Cir. 1965).
14. 150 N.L.R.B. 799 (1965).
15. 150 N.L.R.B. 788 (1965).
16. 150 N.L.R.B. 812 (1965).
17. 169 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1968).
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that it would "continue to adhere to the policy of finding a single-
store unit presumptively appropriate until the Supreme Court rules
on the issue," even though certiorari was denied in Purity Foods,'
8
another chain store case in which the Board's unit finding was re-
jected by the court of appeals. The court considered congressional
intent versus Board policy, and said "that there should be some
minimum consideration given to the employer's side of the picture,
the feasibility and the disruptive effects of piecemeal unionization.
Congress's appreciation of these factors, we believe, is evidenced
by its passage of section 9(c) (5) to the effect that the extent of
organization is not the sole consideration."' 9
This points out a procedural defect in the statute worthy of
consideration by Congress. Under the present law, despite the
tremendous impact of Board decisions in the representation case
area, there is no direct appeal to the reviewing courts on represen-
tation matters. A union has no right whatsoever to obtain any
judicial review of such decisions. An employer can appeal, but only
if the union wins the election, and then he must refuse to bargain
with the union in order to get a court determination of the issues.
In the Say-On case 20 the company could not get a review on the
critical unit issue because the union lost the election. Yet the
Board still uses it as a precedent. Similarly, in the Stern's32 and
related cases, a test is not available since the petitioning union,
once having used the Board's process to establish a far-reaching
precedent adverse to employers and other unions alike, simply
abandoned its organizational efforts and created a precedent which
the courts cannot adjudicate under the present absence of judicial
review in such a situation. Ironically, in R.W.D.S.U. v. N.L.R.B,
22
the court, affirming the Board, stated that since separate units of
selling employees, nonselling employees, and clerical employees
"have not been tested in the courts," it thereby "indicates accept-
ance of them by the industry."
In Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,23 the Board in 1966 originated
a rule by which the Board furnishes unions with the names and
addresses of the employees prior to an election, although traditional
methods of organizing without such assistance had been regarded
as adequate since the days of the Wagner Act. It would appear
18. NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc. (Say-More Food Stores), 354
F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1965).
19. Id. at 931.
20. Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1932 (1962).
21. Stern's Paramus, 150 N.L.R.B. 799 (1965).
22. 385 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
23. 166 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1966).
that the Board rule runs counter to our labor policy to have the
federal government remain neutral. In a sectional analysis of
Executive Order 10988, signed by President Kennedy on January
17, 1962, dealing with union organization in the federal service, the
United States Civil Service Commission set forth guidelines for fed-
eral agencies. One of them is particularly pertinent:
Q. Should a list of names and home addresses be fur-
nished to unions for solicitation purposes?
A. No, that would not be in keeping with the posture of
neutrality management must maintain. It would be
assisting the organization directly.
The Board has also promulgated a new type election notice,
which, while purporting to explain election procedures, emphasizes
employees' rights to organize and employer unfair labor practices,
but gives considerably less emphasis to the coordinate right of
employees not to join unions and union unfair labor practices.
24
This new election notice came as a complete surprise to the members
of the bar practicing before the Labor Board. It was simply
announced by a press release. The Board did not utilize its rule-
making powers under section 6 of the Act, and there was no benefit
of hearing.
FREE SPEECH
Board decisions also restrict employers in their communications
with the employees during union organization, notwithstanding
that Congress in 1947 in section 8(c) adopted a free speech pro-
vision that the "expression of any views, arguments, or opinion" in
any form "shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice. . . ." In spite of section 8(c), the Board holds that com-
munications concerning statements of fact and expressions of opin-
ion may be unfair labor practices or grounds for upsetting an elec-
tion.2 5 In reversing the Board on one of these cases, the second cir-
cuit significantly noted that the "trend of Board decisions" was "to-
wards ever increasing restrictions on employer speech." 26
BOARD ORDERS TO BARGAIN WITHOUT ELECTION
Board orders now often require employers to bargain with a
union without an election, a rapidly growing development which
strikes at the heart of the representation procedures of the Act,
since it may foist on employees a union not of their own choosing.
Under a marked extension of the Joy Silk Mills case, 27 which in-
volved willful and flagrant practices by an employer to undermine
24. N.L.R.B. Press Release, Washington, D.C., Jan. 23, 1967.
25. Lord Baltimore Press, 142 N.L.R.B. 328 (1963); Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962); Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962).
26. NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967).
27. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949).
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the union's undisputed majority, the Board frequently issues orders
to bargain even though the unfair labor practices are neither will-
ful nor flagrant. And, the union cards are of doubtful value since
they may be secured by misrepresentation or other highly ques-
tionable means. In some cases, no unfair labor practices whatso-
ever may have been committed, as where the employer in good
faith questions the union's continued majority,28 or where he has
genuine doubt of the Act's coverage over him.29 The Board's rule
has been severely criticized by objective observers in the field;30
yet the Board continues the practice.
In NLRB v. River Togs,31 the court, reversing the Board,
commented that the "[C] ongress that passed the Taft-Hartley Act
would have been mighty surprised to learn" that such unreliable
cards "could endow the union with the right to represent all
employees and require an employer to recognize it." The court
found it difficult to understand why the Board relied upon cards
signed under an atmosphere of misrepresentation and coercion,
which was in "sharp contrast" to election procedures where the
Board requires strict "laboratory conditions" in order to assure the
employees' free choice. In Purity Food Stores,82 the court observed
that the Board did not give as "pervasive effect to union unfair
labor practices in consideration of union cards as it imposes on the
company." In NLRB v. Flomatic,3 the second circuit said that
the remedy for alleged employer unfair labor practices was "strong
medicine," for it may impose a bargaining representative on em-
ployees not of their own choosing, contrary to the purposes and
policy of the Act. In a case which did not reach the courts, the
trial examiner, viewing the evidence on a first-hand basis, rejected
the cards because they "partake too strongly 'of the fine print'
clauses in contracts. . . ," and it was not necessary for the Board to
"condone chicanery" in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
In reversing, the Board said, "[I]t remains the Trial Examiner's
duty to apply established Board precedent," and thus "considered
the issues herein on the basis of applicable Board precedent" and
28. Laystrom Manufacturing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965).
29. H & W Construction Co., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (1967).
30. Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without a National
Labor Relations Board Election, 65 MICH. L. REV. 851 (1967); Lewis, The
Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16
LAB. L.J. 434 (1965); Comment, Refusal to Recognize Charges Under Section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U.
CHI. L. REV. 386 (1966).
31. 382 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1967).
32. 150 N.L.R.B. 1523, enforcement denied, 354 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1965).
33. 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
certified the union a representative of the employees on the basis
of cards which stated in large case bold type "I WANT AN NLRB
ELECTION NOW" and "Petition and Authorization for NLRB Elec-
tion." Only the "fine print" stated a bargaining authorization.
34
The fourth circuit in Logan Packing Co.,35 in reversing the
Board on a card-check case, said, "It would be difficult to imagine
a more unreliable method of ascertaining the real wishes of em-
ployees. . ." and that "no thoughtful person" would attribute relia-
bility to them.
The Board's general practice is not to vitiate union cards unless
the solicitor said that the only or sole purpose of the card was to
have a Labor Board election. Many courts have frowned on this,
asserting that this mechanical rule does not truly reflect the
desires of the employees. The court, in Swan Supercleaners,6 said
that a "sophisticated and ony modestly talented union agent could
easily live with such a narrow rule and, leaving out the bad words
-'sole' and 'only'-employ language clearly calculated to lead a
woman laundry worker to believe that the holding of an election
was all that she had signed up for."
The Board emphasizes its increasing caseload and the difficulty
in rendering decisions fairly and with dispatch. Yet, I believe it is
fair comment to observe that much of the increased caseload is due
to the new ventures of the Board in these card-check cases as well
as contract interpretation cases, best left to the private parties.
Unions, understanding the tendency of the Board in this direction,
have filed an increasing number of 8(a) (5) cases, and they have
been processed by the Board. I note, for example, in the National
Labor Relations Board report for the fiscal year of 1965, there was a
general overall increase of 8% in unfair labor practices. But there
was a 25% increase-over three times the others-involving refusal
to bargain charges against employers. The trend continues. In
Imco Container Company,37 for example, a case which I tried on
behalf of the employer, the General Counsel issued an 8(a) (5) com-
plaint, when the union withdrew a representation petition. It was
only by the slightest good fortune, which ordinarily would have
escaped the attention of a practitioner that I discovered that a sub-
stantial number of cards already introduced in evidence by the
General Counsel as valid authorizations for membership were out
and out forgeries. Employees who were called to the witness
stand, and who were not interviewed by company counsel before-
hand, testified that they had never signed the cards. Of course,
the 8 (a) (5) complaint was dismissed. But this required an expendi-
34. Lenz Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1399 (1965).
35. NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 384 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1967).
36. Swan Supercleaners v. NLRB, 384 F.2d 609, 620 (6th Cir. 1967).
37. Imco Container Co. of Harrisonburg v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 178 (4th
Cir. 1965).
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ture of manpower and of money. Multiply this by the legion of
cases where the Board is proceeding on 8(a) (5) cases, and sub-
stantial savings in time and in money could be made and the case-
load considerably reduced.
In another case, Crawford Manufacturing Company,81 the
Board relied upon cards to prove majority because they found the
solicitor did not expressly represent the cards to be for the "sole
or only" purpose of having an election under the so-called Cumber-
land Shoe3 9 doctrine. Yet, admittedly, much confusion concerning
the circumstances of signing the cards reigned among the employ-
ees, and many of the employees at least believed that the cards
were signed only to have an election. Yet the Board found the
union had a majority, notwithstanding the union lost in a secret
ballot election. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed and, I respectfully submit, correctly so. Undaunted by these
reversals, the Board still follows the Cumberland40 line. The
Board filed a petition for certiorari in Crawford.41 Whatever the
outcome of the case, however, there has been an abuse of these
authorization procedures contrary to congressional intent. This is
true because of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the Wagner Act
provision, which provided that the Board could use "any other
suitable method to ascertain such representatives" in addition to
the secret ballot, was deleted. While it is true that this pertained
to the Section 9 representation procedures of the Act, it manifested
an intention on the part of Congress that the secret ballot was the
best method of ascertaining the employees' desires. The Board's
practice is surely contrary to the direction Congress sought to give
this crucial matter.
Another recent decision 42 illustrates the Board tendency. Sec-
tion 9 (b) (2), which was a new provision under the Taft-Hartley Act,
provided that "no election shall be conducted in any unit within
which in the preceding 12-month period a valid election has been
held." The idea was to have a period of grace and to stabilize
labor relations once the employees had demonstrated they did not
want a union as bargaining representative. Yet, in Conren, Inc.,4
two unions participated in an election, and both lost. Within the
year, one of them obtained a majority of cards. Despite the stat-
38. Crawford Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1967).
39. 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
40. Id.
41. Crawford Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1967).
42. Conren, Inc. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1966).
43. Id.
ute, the Board held that the company violated the Act by refusing
to bargain with the union. The construction of the statutory one
year rule may be contrasted with the rule imposed by Board de-
cision that certifications are presumptively valid for at least one
year without challenge, and even longer in the absence of "objective
considerations" that the union no longer represents a majority.
And sometimes, as we have noted, as in Laystrom,44 these "objec-
tive considerations" are fairly difficult to prove before the Board.
PICKETING AND STRIKES
The history of labor legislation, since the Wagner Act, has
demonstrated an attempt by Congress to assure employees the
opportunity of an uncoerced freedom of choice in the selection or
rejection of a collective bargaining representative. To that end,
the Wagner Act sought to protect them from various employer
impingements on the expression of the majority will; the Taft-Hart-
ley amendments reflected Congress' awareness that union pres-
sures also frustrated that will.
In the area of unions' organizational and recognitional picket-
ing, however, the means provided by the Taft-Hartley amendments
were demonstrably inadequate to achieve this objective. The sole
provision of Taft-Hartley which was designed to limit organization
picketing was section 8 (b) (4) (C). According to that section, a union
was free to engage in such picketing so long as the picketed em-
ployer was not then obligated to deal with another certified union.
In all other cases, the unions' unlimited right to picket created a
situation where the employers' response might depend alone on its
ability to survive. Whether the union represented a majority
of the employer's employees and, indeed, those employees' interests
generally, could be only ancillary factors to the employer.
Faced on the one hand with these considerations, and on the
other, with unions' right to the protection of first amendment
guarantees and industry gains already made, the Congress sought,
in the 1959 amendments giving rise to section 8(b) (7), to effect a
workable compromise.
The scheme of that compromise focuses on the National Labor
Relations Board's election procedure. In general, in subsections
8(b) (7) (A) and (B), organizational and recognitional picketing are
proscribed where elections either had been held and where they
could not be held. Pursuant to subsection (C), subject to a first
amendment publicity proviso, a union may avoid a finding that its
picketing is unlawful when it files a timely petition for an election.
And an employer may curtail the duration of a union's picketing
by filing such a petition and a charge himself. Consistently, the
Board's rules provide for the holding of an expedited election when
44. Laystrom Manufacturing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965).
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such a petition is filed.
4"
Efforts to understand the various parts and interrelationships
of this complex section have given rise to acknowledged con-
fusion.48 Unfortunately, legislative history is of relatively little
help. After its review of the debates, the ninth circuit was led to
conclude that they were largely inconclusive and that they were
made ". . . by a comparatively small number of members of each
House who were actively promoting clashing points of view ...
[the legislative record] gives no weight to the views of a large
majority who made no speeches but voted.
'47
There are, however, two ideas which permeate this statutory
scheme and which are derivable from the objectives which 8(b) (7)
sought to achieve, from the inherent logic of its components, and
from legislators' comments. These are (1) an intention to limit
picketing as a destructive form of union self-help where the Board
can provide a workable alternative; and (2) the creation of Board
election machinery which will constitute the substitute for that
self-help. Representative Barden's remarks on the expedited elec-
tion proviso illustrate this dual objective. That proviso's purpose
was "to enable an employer or the employees to obtain a prompt
election instead of having to go through an indefinite and pro-
longed period of picket-line warfare, which could have the effect
of placing the employer's business and the jobs of his employees in
jeopardy."
48
That this duality of purpose reflected Congress' design for
section 8(b) (7) was explicitly acknowledged by the Board:
"[T]he underlying statutory scheme . . . is to resolve disputed
45. Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, 102-73 et seq.
46. After enactment of this Section, John H. Fanning, a Board mem-
ber, remarked: "Seldom has legislation packed so many apparent close and
difficult questions in a small amount of type." Speech before the New Or-
leans Federal Bar Association, October 19, 1959. After nearly a year of
experience with this legislation, another Board member, Joseph A. Jen-
kins, concurred: "A mere examination of the language of that statute
would cause anyone, layman or lawyer alike, to realize that there are a
multitude of questions which can be and are being raised regarding its
application and interpretation." Speech before Federal Bar Association
Annual Convention, September, 1960.
Reaction of the courts has been similar. In McLeod v. HREU, Local
89, 280 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1960), for example, that court noted, "the con-
fusing and somewhat self-defeating provisions of the Section"; another
commented that it "presents a number of problems not readily solved by a
reading of the 1959 Act." McLeod v. Local 239, I.B.T., 179 F. Supp. 481
(D.C.N.Y. 1960).
47. Barker Bros. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 431, 437 (9th Cir. 1964).
48. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1813.




The question arises with respect to section 8 (b) (7), whether the
Board's decisions and procedures promote Congress' general desire
to maximize the effective use of the Board's election machinery in
organization-recognitional picketing cases.
I conclude that the Board has not done so. The Board has
carved unnecessary exceptions to situations in which picketing
might have been proscribed and elections held, and has permitted
its election process to become so drawn out as to lose the pro-
tection against destructive self-help it was designed to be.
1. A union engaged in organizational picketing may avoid a
finding that it violates the Act if it files an election petition "within
a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the
commencement of such picketing." One implication of this language
is that a period of less than thirty days is envisioned as "reason-
able" for the usual case. A review of the legislative history sup-
ports this view; otherwise, Congress must be held to have intended
the logical inconsistency that the usual case and the extraordinary
case must be treated alike.50 Yet the Board has refused to require
petitions to be filed in less than thirty days except in those situations
in which picketing has been marked by violence, coercion, threats
and other serious misconduct.5' Accordingly, in other situations
and irrespective of the industry, the effect of picketing both on the
employer's ability to survive and on the employees' right to an
uncoerced free choice, are ignored byproducts of the Board's prac-
tice to interpret "reasonable period" to constitute precisely thirty
days.
The extent to which this practice has subverted Congress' in-
tention appears not merely from a reading of the text itself. The
testimony of then Secretary of Labor Mitchell on the interpretation
to be accorded to the words "reasonable period" reveals that the
definition of this period was to be flexible depending upon the
extent of harm which the picketing inflicts on the particular em-
ployer's business. 2  This is a factor which the Board has con-
sistently ignored.
49. Blinne Construction Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
50. Representative Griffin gave the following interpretation of this
language: "Of course, the picketing may be enjoined in less than thirty
days if the Board finds the circumstances are such as to make it unreason-
able to permit it to continue and it must be stopped at the end of thirty
days." 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1812; NLRB v. Local 239, I.B.T., 389 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1961).
51. Cuneo v. Shoe Workers, 181 F. Supp. 324 (D.C.N.J. 1960) (holding
a ten day period unreasonable delay); District 65, Retail Wholesale &
Department Store Union, 141 N.L.R.B. 991 (1963) (holding twenty-six days
to constitute an unreasonable period).
52. For example, picketing a small-store owner, whose livelihood
depends on the daily receipts of merchandise and the daily outgo
of merchandise, a reasonable time for picketing there might be a
Balance of Power in Labor Relations
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
2. In addition to fostering needless delays in the filing of
election petitions, the procedures which the Board has adopted for
the disposition of these petitions has virtually destroyed their use
as a substitute for "prolonged picket-line warfare." 53
When a picketing union files an election petition, it may thus
forestall the filing of an 8(b) (7) charge by the picketed employer.
In the absence of such a charge, no expedited election is held.
Accordingly, the usual machinery of section 9 of the Act comes into
play, including the necessity to establish an interest showing by
the union; the right to litigate disputed unit and other issues in a
hearing, whether raised genuinely or frivolously; the right to file
objections after the election, and the right to appeal their reso-
lution. Throughout this period, the union is privileged to continue
picketing. This result is a specific and unnecessary Board creation.
For example, the usual election rule under section 9 (c) (3) provides
that no election may be held for twelve months from the date of a
valid election. The twelve-month rule appearing in section 8(b) (7)
(B) is not, in terms, inconsistent. Nonetheless, the Board has de-
termined that for purposes of 8 (b) (7) (B), the twelve-month limi-
tation period on picketing shall commence not from the date of the
election, but from the date of the Board's ultimate certification of
the results of such an election, thus lengthening the period during
which such picketing may be conducted.
4
The union may, at its option, cause even additional delay.
Should the union file unfair labor practice charges against the
picketed employer, it would serve to block the election. The peti-
tion is then held in abeyance while the charges are investigated.
Picketing may continue during investigation. If the charges are
deemed to have merit, the petition continues to be held in abey-
ance while picketing continues. If the charges are dismissed, the
processing of the petition resumes, permitting the union to employ
the delaying tactics described above. Still, the picketing continues.
Moreover, the Board has determined that when a union files
meritorious refusal-to-bargain charges against an employer, it is
very short one because the very life of the business is involved
in the activity of the pickets.
On the other hand, picketing of a factory in the outskirts of
the city which does not receive merchandise very often or does not
ship it very often, the length of time-the reasonable length of
time might be longer.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 315 (1946).
53. These procedures were set out in detail by the Board in its sec-
ond decision in Blinne Construction Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
54. Irvins, Inc. (Local 392, Retail Clerks), 134 N.L.R.B. 686 (1961).
excused from filing any petition at all, notwithstanding that it
was engaged in organizational picketing. The result was reached
over the strongest dissent by Board members Leedom and Rogers,
who found in it an unauthorized departure from congressional pur-
pose constituting still another instance whereunder organizational
picketing is protected at the expense of effective and expeditious
use of the Board's election machinery.55 While at least one district
court has approved the majority's result, such approval was based
on the belief that it was an acceptable exercise of discretion. 8
Presumably, the adoption of the minority view would also have
been acceptable. While either result would be legally permissible,
the issue of wisdom and policy was, at best, left open for argument.
3. In addition to the procedural roadblocks Board decisions
have placed in the way of the effective use of its election processes,
the Board has added certain substantive ones. The problem stems
from the effect to be given the second proviso to section 8(b) (7) (C),
the so-called publicity proviso, which exempts picketing whose "pur-
pose" is truthful publicity concerning an employer's nonunion
status or the absence of a labor contract, from the proscription
against picketing whose "object" is recognitional.
The specific issues presented are: (1) whether picketing to
protest an employer's substandard conditions or his alleged unfair
labor practices falls within the general proscription against organ-
izational picketing; and (2) whether picketing which protests an
employer's non-union status or the absence of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, but which also has an organizational object, falls
within the proviso permitting publicity picketing or into the pro-
scription prohibiting organizational picketing.
In the first Calumet Contractors decision, 57 the Board sought
to come to grips with the first of these issues. It held that when a
union picketed to publicize substandard conditions of an employer
then recognizing another certified union, such picketing had a recog-
nitional or bargaining objective within the meaning of section 8 (b)
(4) (C). Similarly, in Lewis Food Co.,5 8 the Board held that picket-
ing to compel reinstatement of a discriminatorily discharged em-
ployee, where another union had been certified, also violated sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (C) as "necessarily" having a recognitional object. The
significance of these decisions is that they appear to hold that when
a union pickets to achieve some end customarily associated with
what a representative bargains or grieves about-whether relating
to substandard conditions or alleged unfair labor practices-they
thereby seek to achieve a recognitional or bargaining objective.
When Congress enacted section 8(b) (7), which in effect ex-
55. Blinne Construction Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
56. Robert P. Scott, Inc. v. Rothiman, 46 L.R.R.M. 2793 (D.D.C. 1960).
57. 130 N.L.R.B. 78 (1961).
58. 115 N.L.R.B. 890 (1956).
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panded 8 (b) (4) (C), it presumably was aware of these decisions and
having failed to state any disagreement with them, may fairly be
said to have intended to impart them into 8 (b) (7).
Accordingly, the trial examiner, in Claude Everett Con-
struction Co.,' 9 held that when a union picketed to protest sub-
standard wages and threatened to continue to picket until prevail-
ing wage rates were paid, this constituted recognitional or bargain-
ing picketing, citing Calumet Contractors.0 In the absence of a
timely petition filed by the union, a violation of 8(b) (7) (C) was
found.
However, a newly constituted Board, with a different policy
perspective, denied the logic of these decisions and revised the law.
In quick succession, the Board reversed Calumet Contractors,6 re-
versed the holding of Lewis,62 rendered its Claude Everett de-
cision,63 reversing the trial examiner, and decided that picketing
solely to publicize an employer's unfair labor practices had no
recognitional object. 4 The last holding is particularly suspect in-
asmuch as the bill passed by the Senate prior to the final enact-
ment of 8 (b) (7) contained a proposal that any employer unfair labor
practice would constitute a defense to a union's charged violation
of 8(b) (7). This proposal was rejected, giving rise at least to the
inference that a union's picketing to "inform" that the picketed
employer violated the Act was understood and intended by Con-
gress to constitute organizational picketing.6 5
The significance of these charges is that picketing which had
been considered to have an inherently recognitional object now is
no longer so considered. In the absence of other evidence tending
to establish a recognitional object, such picketing is beyond the
reach of any 8 (b) (7) sanctions. Hence, the Board in the exercise
of its prerogative to change its mind, changed it in the direction
of reducing the effectiveness of 8(b) (7) to restrict picketing and
encourage resort to the Board's election machinery.
With respect to the second issue, the Board has again engaged
in a process of mind-changing which has yielded similar results in
reducing the effectiveness of 8(b) (7). As noted before, this issue
relates to picketing which has a dual purpose, one of which is per-
59. 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962).
60. 130 N.L.R.B. 78 (1961).
61. Calumet Contractors Assoc., 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961).
62. Farrelli Ford Sales, 133 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1961).
63. 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962).
64. Blinne Construction Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
65. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 584.
mitted in the publicity proviso while the other is prohibited in the
section's general reference to organizational picketing.
In the first Crown Cafeteria decision,66 the Board majority
held that such "dual-purpose" picketing was unlawful. All that
was permitted, the majority held, was picketing that had the sole
purpose of advising the public, without other evidence of recog-
nitional object.
After a change in Board membership, this interpretation was
reversed on reconsideration. In the second Crown decision,6 7 all
members apparently agreed that a union engaging in infor-
mational picketing normally had an objective of obtaining recog-
nition ultimately and that such picketing was within the protection
of the proviso, despite this ultimate objective.
The split between the majority and minority concerned the
situation where the picket signs and the manner of picketing con-
form to the provisio but there is independent evidence that the
union also had a present objective of obtaining recognition.
In the view of the Board minority, the picketing lost the pro-
tection of the proviso when there was other evidence that the union
was seeking to organize the employees or achieve recognition. The
majority, however, saw no basis for distinction between an as-
sumed objective of ultimately obtaining recognition and direct evi-
dence of a recognition objective. In either case, the Board held
that the proviso protected picketing that also had the purpose of
informing the public. Indeed, in the majority's view: "We might
well concede that in the long view all union activity, including
strikes and picketing, has the ultimate economic objective of or-
ganization and bargaining."
Thus, the Board succeeded in contracting the scope of 8 (b) (7)
and increased unions' right to picket to obtain recognition, all in
conflict with Congress' purpose in enacting that section. While the
view of the Board majority received the approval of an appellate
court,68 it was rejected by Congressmen Landrum and Griffin as
being antithetical to the intent of Congress. 9
Pursuant to the approach of the Board majority in Crown,0
the principal difficulty in dual-purpose picketing cases is to deter-
mine if the purpose is really "dual;" that is, whether the picketing
66. 130 N.L.R.B. 570 (1961).
67. Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962).
68. Smitley d/b/a Crown Cafeteria v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 251 (9th Cir.
1964).
69. The extent to which this is true is reflected in the fact that on
April 10, 1962, Congressmen Landrum and Griffin addressed the House of
Representatives and stated, in part: "The pattern of recent decisions by
the NLRB gives rise to a serious concern that policies laid down by Con-
gress in the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts, are being distorted
and frustrated, to say the very least." 108 CONG. REC. 5699-5700 (1962).
70. Crown Cafeteria, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962).
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is "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public" within the
meaning of the proviso, or whether such an alleged purpose is
merely sham to mask a recognitional object. Picketing that pur-
ports to be informational is not protected by the proviso if the
union in fact does not have a purpose of advising the public. In
ascertaining the union's tactical purposes, a distinction between
these two categories of picketing has been made:
Signal picketing, where the union's purpose is to use the picket
line as a signal to obtain organized economic action backed by
union discipline, thereby halting pick-ups, deliveries and other serv-
ice by neutrals.
True publicity picketing, which appeals only to employees of
the primary employer and to the unorganized public for sponta-
neous popular support.
Using this distinction, it has been held that signal picketing
is not protected by the proviso and is unlawful if it has recognition
or organization as an object. True publicity picketing is protected,
however, unless it actually interferes with deliveries or communi-
cates more than the limited information expressly permitted by the
proviso, notwithstanding the pressure of an organizational object.71
Illustrative of the manner in which this distinction does, or
does not, operate, are the so-called area-standards picketing cases.
In its decision in Claude Everett Construction Co.,7 2 the Board
held that no violation of 8 (b) (7) (C) had occurred because the union
was picketing, according to the legend on its sign, to protest "sub-
standard wages and conditions being paid on this job by the Claude
Everett Company." It found that the union's objective was to in-
duce the company to raise its wage scale to that prevailing in that
area, and thus the picketing was protected notwithstanding its in-
terference with pick-ups and deliveries on the project.
In Texarkana Construction Co.,7 3 before picketing, the union
asked the employer whether "union men" were to be employed on
the project. Receiving a negative answer, the union commenced
picketing with signs stating that the employer was not "paying
prevailing wage rate." The employer was in fact paying wages
lower than the ratio determined under the Davis-Bacon Act, and
lower than the picketing union's scale. The Board brushed aside
71. This approach has received Board and court approval. Smitley
d/b/a Crown Cafeteria v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Local 3, IBEW, 317 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1963); Electrical Workers Union, 144
N.L.R.B. 5 (1963).
72. 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962).
73. 138 N.L.R.B. 102 (1962).
the union's initial inquiry regarding the hiring of union men and
held that the union's picketing was not for organization or represen-
tation purposes. In Keith Riggs Plumbing and Heating Contrac-
tor,74 picketing was held to be a legitimate protest of substandard
conditions, notwithstanding the fact that the union solicited mem-
bership from the employer's employees several weeks before the
picketing began and several of the employees joined the union
after the picketing began. Picketing remained lawful according to
the Board, although (1) several employees joined the union after
the picketing began, and (2) the union business agent mentioned
the advantages of union membership in discussing other topics
with an employee. These incidents did not establish that the
union's real objective was organizational, held the Board, so that
the picketing was and remained informational in nature, hence
exempt from the proscription of 8 (b) (7).75
An analysis of the Board's handling of 8(b) (7) (C) and its pub-
licity proviso yields the following judgments. The congressional
debates leading to the passage of 8 (b) (7) failed to disavow existing
Board authority which held that a union engages in recognitional
picketing when it attempts to achieve through picketing what is
otherwise the function of a bargaining representative. This failure
most strongly implied that Congress intended 8 (b) (7) to reflect that
view. Post-passage Board precedent holding such picketing to
be merely informational in nature, contravenes Congress' intent.
The Board's approach is really quite artificial since any unorgan-
ized employer which is picketed, whether the picketing be labeled
informational, area-standards, or whatever, believes that the union's
object is organizational. Such employer's decision and its employ-
ees' decision is governed by that belief. Moreover, to perpetuate a
distinction between information and organization-recognitional
picketing, encourages unions to engage in verbal sham; picket signs
and conversations may be tailored to satisfy the distinction while,
in fact, all parties behave as if the organizational object is explicit.
Unfortunately, the Board has tended to encourage these fictions.
As an analysis of such cases as Texarkana,76 and Keith Riggs,77
reveals, the Board has exhibited some tendency to avoid finding
the existence of a recognitional object despite independent evidence
of such an object, by according undue weight to the self-serving
terms of unions' picket signs. Therefore, instead of moving the
parties closer to an election as the method by which representational
decisions are to be made, the Board's rule-changing has moved
them farther apart.
This conclusion is particularly apt in connection with the
74. 137 N.L.R.B. 1125 (1962).
75. Id.
76. Texarkana Construction Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 102 (1962).
77. Keith Riggs Plumbing and Heating Contractor, 137 N.L.R.B. 1125
(1962).
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Board's revised treatment of area-standards picketing. To pretend
that such picketing is not inherently organizational, and hence out-
side the reach of 8(b) (7), gives rise to two undesirable results.
First, it induces unorganized employers to recognize picketing
unions because they are subject to economic pressures without an
opportunity to file meritorious 8 (b) (7) charges and obtain expedited
elections. Second, where the picketed employer is already recog-
nized, it results in a situation where represented employees'
working conditions are affected or established by a union other
than their own. Finally, the distinction between signal and pub-
licity picketing, as a means for determining a union's true object,
is similarly suspect. Whether a union appeals to consumers or to
other union members may only relate to which approach it believes
to be more efficacious in achieving its recognitional object. In
any event, the effect on the picketed employer is the same, what-
ever the pressure's source.
These decisions have a great impact, and tend to create, not
reduce, industrial strife, which is the purpose of the legislation. For
example, in 1967, List & Clark Construction Company, a building
contractor in the Kansas City area, was engaged in building a dam
and reservoir for the U.S. Corps of Engineers near Albuquerque,
New Mexico. The union, which later events showed represented
only three of some 27 workers, picketed for recognition. When the
contractor refused, the union extended the picketing to other con-
struction projects essential to the public welfare at Perry Kansas,
Ellwood, Kansas, and Stockton, Missouri, where the employer had
labor contracts with other unions who refused to cross the picket
line. The company immediately filed a representation proceeding
with the Board to have an expedited election, which the Act re-
quires. Section 8(b) (7) (C) plainly provides that when a petition
has been filed in recognition picketing cases-and there was no
question but that this was involved here-the Board "shall forth-
with . . . direct an election. . . ." Yet it was over two months be-
fore the Board held an election, and in the meantime essential public
work projects came to a halt. The delay was caused in part by the
filing of ungrounded unfair labor practice charges against the em-
ployer (28-CA-1534), and, as stated above, the Board would not
proceed. This was unlawful recognition picketing. The work was
essential to the public interest, but it was stopped. The employer
was damaged by well over $100,000, and the employees lost hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in wages. This is the type of thing I
am talking about, and these decisions hurt at the grassroots level.
Who would deny that Congress intended to foreclose this? The
answer is self-evident.78
While I was not in the case, I am advised that in a matter involv-
ing Sears, a union, the ILGWU, attempted to organize Sears Fash-
ion Center in North Bergen, New Jersey. These organizational
efforts continued for about two or three months, at which time the
union started picketing. The company filed 8(b) (7) (C) charges on
February 10. The union then filed unfair labor practice charges
against the company and claimed that the picketing was for that
purpose. The attorney for the union also filed a so-called dis-
claimer, asserting that the picketing did not have an organizational
or recognition objective. This, under Board rules, insulated the
union from the 8 (b) (7) (C) proscriptions, and the 8(b) (7) (C)
charge was dismissed.79 While there is serious doubt that in the
circumstances the disclaimer was bona fide, it gave the union the
latitude it needed, and it extended the picketing to 108 additional lo-
cations. The unfair labor practice charges against the company were
dismissed, yet it was for that asserted reason that picketing was
allowed from just a few days to up to nine months in 108 different
locations. Sears was able to stand firm. I question how many
other employers would be able to do so.
CO-DETERMINATION
Once the bargaining relationship has been established, the pat-
tern of Board decisions reappears in a doctrine which allows the
union a voice in decision-making on issues that had always been
regarded within the authority of management. The principle of
co-determination, first enunciated in Town & Country Manufactur-
ing Co.80 and Fibreboard Paper Products Co.,81 which required
prior bargaining on an economic decision to subcontract, has since
been extended to encompass decisions to automate certain oper-
ations and terminate others, and to close a plant and cease busi-
ness.8 2 Note that this requires bargaining on the decision itself, not
just the effects of the decision on the employees, a matter more
properly within the union's area of interest.
Board decisions may influence or even compel acceptance of
78. Hearing on H.R. 11725 Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor
of the Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 386 (1967).
79. Statement Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (May 31, 1968) (statement of
Gerard C. Smetanal).
80. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
81. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
82. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1966); William J. Burn's
Int'l Detective Agency Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1964), modified, NLRB v.
William J. Burn's Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965);
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964), reconsidered, 152
N.L.R.B. 619 (1965), enforcement denied and remanded, NLRB v. Royal
Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); Renton News Record,
136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
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substantive provisions of a contract, despite statutory provisions
that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to
a proposal or require the making of a concession," expressly
adopted by Congress to prevent the Board "from determining the
merits of the positions of the parties.!'" Yet the Board may regard
the rejection of union demands by an employer as evidence of bad
faith in not reaching agreement, 4 and it has, indeed, ordered a
union dues check-off provision incorporated in a labor contract."8
The doctrine of co-determination will unquestionably make our in-
dustry less sufficient and less competitive in the markets of
the world.
STRIKES AND LOCKOUT AFTER IMPASSE
One other phase of Board doctrine illustrates, I believe, the
tendency to both disregard congressional policy and unsettle the
bargaining balance in the critical area where the assertion of power
can be most effective, where an impasse has been reached and
each party exerts all available economic weapons in pursuit of its
bargaining objectives. What are the views of the several courts
on whether the policies of Congress are carried out? In the John
Brown Food case,86 one of five retail food operators in a multi-em-
ployer bargaining unit was struck. In keeping with a right which
long had been recognized by the Supreme Court in Buffalo Linen
Supply,87 the other employers locked out for a defensive reason,
to prevent the union's whipsawing tactic, a tactic employed to
divide and conquer each employer successively. The Board, how-
ever, held that the lockout was illegal on the grounds that the
struck employer was operating with temporary help. On appeal,
the tenth circuit 8 denied enforcement, noting that the Board
should not "choose sides," and that it was not "common sense" to
require an employer to "aid and abet" the success of the whipsaw
strike. It concluded that were this principle announced by the
Board to prevail, the right of the lockout which the Supreme Court
had declared lawful would be rendered "largely illusory." On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, admonishing the Board that
"the Act does not constitute the Board as an arbiter of the sort of
83. H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947).
84. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 877 (1961).
85. Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1967).
86. 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
87. NLRB v. Truckdrivers Local 449, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, etc. (Buffalo Linen Supply Company), 353 U.S. 87, aff'g 109
N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
88. NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1964).
economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance
of the bargaining demands."'9 Again, in American Ship Build-
ing,90 the Board held a company lockout was illegal. Reversing,
the Supreme Court declared that the Board "construes its func-
tions too expansively when it claims general authority to define
national labor policy by balancing the competing interests of labor
and management." It stated that the "role assumed by the Board
in this area is fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of
the Act. ... 91
In Hawaii Meat Co.9 2 and Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co.,98
the Board found that employers engaged in illegal practices when
they subcontracted their work to maintain business during an eco-
nomic strike without first notifying or consulting the union. This
was an extension, of course, of the Board's Fibreboard doctrine.
9 4
The ninth circuit and the seventh circuit reversed. In reversing,
the court in Abbott said that it would be "a startling doctrine in-
deed . . . to tell companies and employers faced with extinction
because of a strike that before they can make economic business
decisions to contract out work in order to continue operations they
must first consult the union that caused the threat of extinction."95
Despite the judicial pronouncement in American Ship Build-
ing9" and the admonition of the Court that the Board has no
"authority to define national labor policy by balancing the compet-
ing interests of labor and management," the Board still undertakes
to do so, and without an even hand. One example of this dualism
can be found by comparing David Friedland Painting Co.9 7 with
Television & Radio Artists.9 8 In David Friedland, an employer in
the construction business, who operated in the territorial juris-
diction of one local union, locked out his employees in another area
who were members of a sister local that was on strike against an
employer association in that area and where the company also per-
formed work. He clearly had an economic interest in the outcome
of these negotiatons. The Board held that the lockout was unlaw-
ful and said that the employer simply had a "collateral or in-
direct interest in the labor dispute," and that it did not serve as
"sufficient justification for a lockout. . . ."19 The Board stated that
it was immaterial that the employer was "affected economically
.89. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965).
90. 142 N.L.R.B. 173 (1963), affld, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev.
380 U.S. 300 (1965).
91. 380 U.S. 300, 315, 316, 318 (1965).
92. 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).
93. 331 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964).
94. Fibreboard Paper Products Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
95. Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co., 331 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1964).
96. American Ship Building, 142 N.L.R.B. 173 (1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d
839 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
97. 158 N.L.R.B. 571 (1966).
98. 160 N.L.R.B. 241 (1966).
99. David Friedland Painting Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 571, 578 (1966).
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by the outcome of the negotiations between the union and another
employer association," even though he operated in the territorial
jurisdiction of the association. In contrast, in Television & Radio
Artists, decided by the Board about two months later and where
the "shoe was on the other foot," the Board accommodated the
union conduct in approving what was otherwise an illegal demand
for a hot cargo agreement affecting other unions. The Board
said that it was in the "union's interest" to protect the "standards"
of another union in another area. In approving the union's bar-
gaining position, the Board said: "The fact that the [union] rep-
resentative admitted that the union also desired to protect the wage
standards of union members not working for [the employer] does
not by itself affect the lawfulness of such conduct. . . . Whenever
a union also represents other units of employees," it has an interest
in "protecting the wage standards of such other employees."'100
The rationale of the two decisions cannot be squared. The lan-
guage of the court in NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers"' comes to mind:
The Board is no 'Pooh Bah' to loose and bind at will.
Congress made it an agency not as a labor board-created
to aid labor in its struggle against the employer. As
shown by its name, Congress created it to be a board
concerned with the administration of 'labor relations' in
which the rights of the employer are to be as jealously
guarded as those of the employee. We repeat Judge
Learned Hand's gustatory comment that the Board should
be vigilant to see that what was sauce for the goose under
the Wagner Act is now sauce for the gander under the
Taft-Hartley Act.
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Again, these decisions hurt at the "grassroots" level, especially
so in the construction industry, where these decisions apply and
where collective bargaining has failed dramatically. For example,
in the Kansas City area a plumbers and pipefitters strike of ten
weeks' duration was settled the first part of August, 1967, with
wage increases totaling 33 per cent. The settlement was unreason-
able and inflationary, but it was dictated by the monopoly power
which the union exercised over the supply of labor. This increase
will have a chain reaction in all of the construction industry, and
the increase will finally be passed on to the ultimate consumer.
Although the employers resisted, the resistance was futile, and
there was no other effective resistance on behalf of the public who
must pay the bill. The situation is even worse elsewhere. In the
100. Television & Radio Artists, 160 N.L.R.B. 241 (1966).
101. 179 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 1950).
102. Id. at 592.
construction industry, settlements have been inflationary and out
of all reason.
UNION RIGHTS V. EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Board decisions, however, involve more than the relationship
between management vis-a-vis unions. They also involve decisions
relating to union control over its members. In this area, the Board,
when confronted with a choice between union power vis-a-vis in-
dividual rights, appears to side with the former. The Board has
freed unions from liability for fining employees who exceed union
prescribed production quotas'08 and who may cross picket lines in
order to go to work in violation of union policy. 10 4 They have
permitted expulsions from membership of employees who utilize
provisions of the Act for filing a decertification petition with the
Board 0 5 or who seek a union shop de-authorization.106
Another "grassroots" example is the WDAF-TV (Taft Broad-
casting Company)'0 7 case in which AFTRA called a strike against
the TV station in Kansas City in December, 1965. Six employees
wanted to resign from the union and work. They turned in their
resignations, but the union rejected them. Then, when the em-
ployees crossed the picket line, the union in early January, 1966,
fined them in sums ranging from $10,000 to $20,000 each, aggre-
gating a total of $94,000. What a potent weapon against the exer-
cise of their section 7 rights! Unfair labor practice charges were
filed by the company on behalf of these employees on July 6, 1966,
but the Regional Director dismissed. His action was sustained
by the General Counsel, citing the Allis Chalmers'0 8 decision
for authority. I am satisfied that the union's conduct was an
unfair labor practice, even assuming the validity of the Allis
Chalmers'°9 doctrine, since the employees, first, resigned from
the union and should have been regarded as free agents, and,
second, the fines were not reasonable. Yet the General Counsel
refused to proceed, and there is no appeal from his decision under
established law. Something is wrong somewhere. The General
Counsel is as capable and dedicated a man as I know, and a man
whom I personally greatly admire. He himself has admitted
that it is part of the functions of the office to "explicate unsettled
areas of the law [and] explore the proper limits of the statute."
At the very least, this was such a case, and I urged it on him.
Yet we got no action-and somehow these employees have the
feeling they were let down. Something is wrong with the structure
103. Wisconsin Motors Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964).
104. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
105. Tawas Tube Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
106. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 692 (1965).
107. 17-CB-476.
108. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
109. Id.
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somewhere. Perhaps there should be a right to appeal from a
refusal to issue a complaint-not to the office of the General Coun-
sel, but possibly to a special section in the Trial Examiner's office,
or possibly to the district court who will determine "reasonable
cause to believe," much like 10 (j) and 10 (1) proceedings, so that the
Board can consider the case. The case stands as a monumental
warning to employees who may choose to exercise their rights to
refrain, contrary to union policy. Section 7 rights stand as a beacon
to mockery. I do not think Congress intended to permit such un-
warranted action when it provided in section 8(b) (1) that a labor
organization had the right to "prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein."
BROADER AND MUTUAL REMEDIES
Some union spokesmen have stated that, in fact, the Board is
remiss in not expanding remedies to be more meaningful and
effective against employers who commit violations. This was in-
deed the subject of inquiry in House Hearings on H.R. 11725 to in-
crease the effectiveness of Board remedies. There is, of course, no
objection to the imposition of appropriate remedies against employ-
ers who commit unfair labor practices, but in devising remedies for
violations of the Act by employers the Board should be equally
vigilant in devising remedies against unions who engage in
violations of the law and who cause loss of wages to the individual
employee. The Board has ordered back-pay against unions under
section 8(b) (2) of the Act, a very narrow area, but the Board has
failed to provide any remedy where employees have lost work be-
cause of an illegal picket line or an illegal secondary boycott or an
illegal jurisdictional strike or an illegal strike against certification.
A back-pay remedy woud be an effective deterrent to a continu-
ation of such unlawful conduct. For example, in the List &
Clark Construction Company" 0 situation to which I earlier re-
ferred, the union engaged in unlawful picketing for over two
months. The employees and members of other crafts wanted to
work, but did not cross the picket line because they were threatened
with fines. As a result, over 200 employees in Missouri and Kansas
lost wages through no fault of their own. I would submit that
they should have been made whole by reason of the union's un-
fair labor practices. An unemployed worker is no less unemployed
by whoever commits the unfair labor practices, whether by the
unions or employers. Mutuality of enforcement requires that all
110. See p. 239 supra.
be treated alike. The Board, in my judgment, now has the power
under the board remedial provisions of the Act to impose appro-
priate remedies, and it would serve a salutary purpose to do so. I
would urge that mutuality of enforcement requires that wherever
the employee is prevented from working and earning wages
whether by reason of union unfair labor practices or employer un-
fair labor practices, he be made whole. I am thinking of the situ-
ation where the employee wants to work; he is capable of working;
but is unable to do so because of violence, or unfair recognition
picketing, or secondary boycotts, or jurisdictional disputes, or strikes
against a certification of another union. These are cases where an
employee is coerced into respecting a picket line; or, if he has the
temerity to cross a picket line to go to work, "he changes his
mind" because of unlawful threats or for violating union rules.
These rights are statutory rights of employees "to refrain from
engaging in union activity." The "right to refrain from union
activity" should be protected as much as the right to engage in
union activity. The one right is coordinate with the other, and
when they are violated by either unions or employers, the employee
should be compensated for any loss of wages earned by reason
of the unfair labor practices of either. Evenhanded treatment
brooks no disparity.
PRE-EMPTION
Former Congressman Hartley, a co-sponsor of the Taft-Hartley
Law has stated"' that, while court decisions as developed in Gar-
ner n1 2 and Garmon.13 had withdrawn state control over union
activities, Congress "had not the slightest intention of depriving
the states and state courts of their traditional functions of pro-
tecting the rights of their citizens;" that nothing in the Act gave
the Board "exclusive jurisdiction" to deal with unlawful union
conduct. I would like to amplify this somewhat. Judicial dis-
covery of preemption has summarily declared invalid state laws
regulating union activity, and increased the power of organized
labor. I would illustrate the force of pre-emption in two cases in
Missouri-one before federal pre-emption and one after. Each
case involved substantially the same union conduct and the same
state statute. In the case decided before pre-emption, Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co." 4 the United States Supreme Court held
that Missouri anti-trust laws applied to it. It said that unions
did not have a "peculiar immunity from trade restraint combi-
111. Statement before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers,
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, March 26, 1968.
112. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffers and Helpers Local Union No. 776,
346 U.S. 485 (1953).
113. San Diego Bldg. Traders Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
114. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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nations." In finding a union boycott illegal, it declared that to
"exalt all labor union conduct in restraint of trade above all state
control would greatly reduce the traditional powers of states over
their domestic economy ... ."115 Six years later, in Weber v. An-
heuser Busch,1 6 after pre-emption, the Court held that the same
type of union conduct was no longer subject to restraint, and a
union boycott could be conducted in disregard of state laws. Thus
unions have achieved that "peculiar immunity" from laws that
bind all other citizens. Plainly, in the light of pre-emption, the
Board should be especially vigilant to carry out the will of Con-
gress.
CONCLUSION
As I stated at the outset, there is growing disenchantment with
the concept of free collective bargaining. Strikes have not dimin-
ished; they have increased. The question has been raised whether
the Board has carried out congressional intent. I submit that it has
not, and that a cause of growing labor strife and settlements against
the public interest may be found by examining labor decisions as a
point of departure. It may be concluded that there must be a
restructuring of our labor statutes to re-establish equality in the
labor-management equation, which has been maladjusted through
decisions weighing heavily on the side of organized labor. Equality
in bargaining must be re-established as a prerequisite for both
rational solutions and industrial relations stability. It may also
be concluded that our labor statutes, distorted by administrative
and judicial interpretation, must be given a chance to work as
Congress originally intended. Experts are struggling to find a
satisfactory solution to the problem of increasing industrial strife
and strikes against the public interest. Some observers believe
that the right to strike is outmoded in today's society and that
we must revise our traditional thinking that strikes are a neces-
sary part of a free economy. They question whether the right to
strike is so sanctified as to jeopardize the interest of others.
117
115. Id. at 497.
116. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
117. An outstanding authority has said:
Can we really expect the affected publics to be persuaded that
government intervention will jeopardize a bulwark of democracy,
when relatively small numbers of private groups are able to jeo-
pardize, seemingly at will, bulwarks of the economy? Is it not
as reasonable that they should conclude that there is something
wrong with the very procedures whose sanctity is being protested
by those who ask 'hands off'?
Chamberlain, Strikes in Contemporary Context, IND. & LAB. RFL. REv., Vol.
20, No. 4 (1967).
There are those, on the other hand, who reject solutions such as
compulsory arbitration or mediation to a finality or any other
procedure which would impose a government dictated bargain on
the parties as being but the prelude to the future dictation of other
aspects of our industrial economy.
These proposals, I believe, miss the mark; for they deal with
the effects, not the cause, of potential labor disputes. Nor do
they purport to reach the overwhelming majority of strikes which
are not of a national emergency character but which nevertheless
deeply affect the local interests of the community. The real ans-
wer lies, in my judgment, in a restoration of the balance. Equality
in bargaining power must be re-established as a prerequisite for
both rational solutions and stability in industrial relations. Legis-
lation to restore balanced rights once accomplished would not only
ameliorate disputes of a national character but would apply as
well to disputes of local public interest, while at the same time
reinforcing the principle of voluntarism. If this is done, free col-
lective bargaining, now under severe attack, would once more be
honored as the keystone of our national labor policy. Neither
organized labor nor management should object to a restoration of
the balance. For a free society would protest the imposition of
governmental controls. But a free society also has the right to
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